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Abstract 
 
In the current study, we investigated the effects of 
dispositional variables on self-reported trust and 
suspicion perceptions of one’s partner in a maze-
running task. Dispositional variables interact with 
situational variables in expressing behaviors. In 
order to test the effects of three dispositional 
variables (i.e., dispositional trust, dispositional 
distrust, and dispositional suspicion) on self-reported 
trust and suspicion perceptions towards a partner (a 
human or a Nao robot), we ran two discontinuous 
growth models. Overall, we found that participants’ 
trust towards their partner decreased when the 
partner engaged in untrustworthy behaviors as 
expected. In addition, changes in trust perceptions 
towards the partner were predicted by participants’ 
level of dispositional trust. These results have 
implications for studying the effects of dispositional 
variables on context-dependent trust perceptions 
within the trust process.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Interpersonal trust affects the degree to which 
people develop and maintain various healthy social 
relationships, including both romantic [1] and work 
[2] relationships. Interpersonal trust researchers 
began studying trust in human-human interactions. In 
this context, Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman [3] 
defined trust as a person’s willingness to be 
vulnerable to another, without the trustor monitoring 
that trustee’s actions. Human-human trust has been 
studied extensively in the workplace, and researchers 
have stated that trust has shown increased importance 
in the workplace with the emergence of work teams 
[4] and increased diversity in the workforce [3]. 
Indeed, Colquitt, Scott, and LePine [5] used meta-
analytic techniques and found that dispositional trust, 
a general willingness to trust others, had both direct 
effects on job performance (i.e., task performance, 
citizenship behaviors, and counterproductive 
behaviors) and indirect effects on performance via 
perceptions of trustworthiness and trust intentions. In 
their seminal article, Mayer et al. [3] delineated 
between three factors that compose the trust process 
(i.e., dispositional trust, perceived trustworthiness, 
and trust intentions). 
Recently, researchers have focused on the role of 
dispositional trust in the trust process when humans 
interact with automation [6, 7, 8]. In their extensive 
review, Hoff and Bashir described trust applied to 
interactions with technology as “trust in automation.” 
Generally, researchers have found that human users 
are more likely to use, and less likely to monitor, 
automation they trust, especially under uncertain 
conditions [6, 9, 10]. 
We should note, however, that trust is dynamic 
and can change based on the nature of human-
automation interactions [6]. Hoff and Bashir 
described three separate layers of trust variability, 
which include: (a) dispositional trust, (b) situational 
trust, and (c) learned trust. Dispositional trust was 
defined as one’s tendency to be willing to be 
vulnerable to automation, whereas situational trust 
was defined as one’s willingness to be vulnerable to 
automation in specific contexts. Learned trust refers 
to the attitudes the trustor has towards the 
automation, which is gained from prior experience or 
present interactions with the system. If the person has 
no prior experience with the system, then he or she 
must rely on the system’s current performance to 
calibrate dynamic learned trust [6]. In fact, prior 
research has found that both consistency (i.e., 
reliability) and predictability of automation influence 
trust [11, 12, 13, 14]. 
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Although characteristics of the automation (e.g., 
reliability) affect the extent to which humans trust it, 
dispositional trust also affects the degree to which 
humans rely on automation [6, 14]. Specifically, Hoff 
and Bashir noted that dispositional trust has the 
greatest influence on learned trust before the person 
interacts with the automation. Similarly, researchers 
within the human-human interpersonal trust domain 
have found that dispositional trust has the greatest 
effect on the trust process during initial interactions 
(i.e., when the trustor has limited interactions with 
the trustee; [15, 16, 17]). Within the human-
automation literature, researchers have empirically 
demonstrated that dispositional trust influences 
perceived trustworthiness prior to interaction with 
automation, but not after extended exposure [14].  
Thus, participants scoring higher in dispositional trust 
might be more likely to report more trustworthiness 
towards the referent early in the experiment. 
Stemming from Rotter’s [18] early work, Mayer 
and Davis [19] published the Propensity to Trust 
scale, a measure of dispositional trust, which has 
been used widely across the organizational [5] and 
the personality [15, 20] literatures. In addition to the 
Propensity to Trust scale, an IPIP NEO-PI-R Trust 
facet of Agreeableness [21] measures the extent to 
which humans have a predisposition to trust others 
generally. The items that compose the Trust facet 
scale are more general than those in the Propensity to 
Trust scale [19]. For example, a sample item from the 
IPIP NEO-PI-R Trust facet scale reads, “Trust 
others,” whereas a sample item from Mayer and 
Davis’s scale reads, “Most sales people are honest in 
describing their products.” Because the IPIP NEO-PI-
R Trust facet scale comprises more general items 
than the Propensity to Trust scale, Mayer and Davis’s 
scale may predict specific trust intentions in the trust 
process better than IPIP NEO-PI-R Trust. In other 
words, because items from the IPIP NEO-PI-R Trust 
facet scale do not include specific referents, the scale 
may be more distal to trust intentions than items from 
Mayer and Davis’ scale. In comparison, Mayer and 
Davis’ scale may predict criterion more proximal to 
the context-dependent trust intentions. Similar 
research from the human factors literature shows that 
more contextually relevant and proximal items 
measuring propensity to trust automation had greater 
predictive validity of trust outcomes of interest than 
scales comprising more general items [22]. 
Constructs other than dispositional trust, however, 
may be important predictors of trust-relevant 
outcomes, too. 
Dispositional distrust corresponds to a person’s 
predisposition to assume others are untrustworthy 
and have intentions to harm the trustor [23]. 
Although some researchers have made clear that trust 
and distrust reside on a continuum [24], others have 
claimed that distrust is a separate construct from trust 
[25]. Chang and Fang [23] found that participants’ 
context-dependent trust and distrust influenced 
internet-relevant behaviors. Specifically, the effects 
of context-dependent distrust on the prevention of 
risky behavior were stronger compared to the effects 
of trust on the promotion of low-risk behaviors. As 
such, dispositional trust and dispositional distrust 
may account for unique variance in trust-related 
outcomes. Thus, we tested whether a measure of 
dispositional distrust predicts trust-related 
perceptions after controlling for the effects of 
dispositional trust. 
Similar to the trust-distrust debate, prior research 
has suggested that suspicion is a separate construct 
from trust and distrust [26, 27]. Suspicion in the 
moment comprises uncertainty, cognitive activity, 
and perceived mal-intent. Similarly, Bobko et al. 
defined dispositional suspicion as the degree to which 
a person engages in cognitive processing and 
perceives mal-intent when interacting in ambiguous 
circumstances in general. To test this claim, Capiola 
et al. [28] found some support that dispositional trust 
and suspicion are separate, but related, constructs. 
Furthermore, dispositional trust and suspicion 
explained unique variance in outcomes of interest 
[28]. As such, dispositional suspicion may explain 
variance in context-dependent trust and suspicion 
after controlling for dispositional trust and distrust. 
 
1.1. The current study 
 
The current study investigated the effects of 
dispositional trust, dispositional distrust, and 
dispositional suspicion on trustworthiness 
perceptions and context-dependent suspicion during a 
laboratory task, in which participants were randomly 
assigned to interact with a human or automated 
partner. We tested these effects by studying repeated 
measurements across six time points on two trust-
related measures. Stated simply, we used individual 
difference variables to explain inter-individual and 
intra-individual differences in trust-related 
perceptions over time. We sought to answer the 
following research questions: 
• RQ1: Are there differences in perceived 
trustworthiness and suspicion across partner 
conditions? 
• RQ2: What individual difference variables 
are the best predictors of changes in partner 
trustworthiness perceptions before and after a 
trust violations? 
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• RQ3: What individual difference variables 
are the best predictor of changes in suspicion 
perceptions before and after a trust 
violations? 
 
 
2. Method  
 
2.1. Participants 
 
Participants (N = 49) were undergraduates (57% 
female) from a medium-sized Midwestern university. 
Participants’ average age was 23.04 years (SD = 
4.62). Participants completed the study in exchange 
for monetary compensation. 
 
2.2. Experimental task 
 
Participants completed the Checkmate task [29], a 
modified version of the investor/dictator game [30]. 
Researchers have used the investor/dictator game to 
measure trust amongst a dyad, with the objective 
being to earn money throughout the session. The 
dyad consists of an investor (i.e., the person who 
controls the amount of money given to the dictator) 
and the dictator (i.e., the person who decides how 
much money to return to the investor). The game can 
be played across multiple rounds, and the amount of 
money shared during each round between the dyad 
can be interpreted as an act of trust between the 
partners. The investor/dictator game was modified to 
remove the transparency of how much money each 
person has at any point in the game [29]. Because 
trust is defined as the willingness to be vulnerable to 
another’s actions independent of the ability to 
monitor the other’s behavior, [29] created the 
Checkmate task to embed ambiguity into the game 
(i.e., removing the trustor’s ability to monitor the 
trustee’s behavior directly). 
 In the current version of Checkmate, the 
participant was always assigned to the role of banker 
(i.e., the investor in the investment/dictator game). A 
robot [or a human confederate] was always assigned 
the role of runner (i.e., the dictator in the 
investment/dictator game). The participant loaned 
money to the runner over six experimental rounds, 
and the runner ran a virtual maze to collect as many 
boxes as possible to increase monies. The banker 
started with $50 USD in a virtual bank account. The 
banker loaned money to the runner each round in 
anticipation of earning interest on his investment.  
At the beginning of each round, the runner 
promised to return the initial loan and 50% of the 
earnings to the banker. The banker was notified via a 
pop-up message of the risk level and the amount of 
money the runner promised to return. Then, the 
banker selected an amount to loan to the runner: 
Small ($1 - $7), Medium ($4 - $10), or Large ($7 - 
$13). Money was then transferred into the runner’s 
virtual wallet. Once the maze-running task started, 
the banker watched a top-down video of the runner’s 
progress. The runner was allotted two minutes to 
collect as many boxes as possible. After the maze-
running task completed, the runner decided the 
amount of money to return to the banker. The banker 
received a pop-up message of the exact amount of 
money the runner decided to return. 
The steps outlined above were repeated over six 
rounds. Participants were informed that all money 
exchanged in the task represented real money. The 
amount of money the banker had in his/her virtual 
bank at the end of the session belonged to the banker, 
and the earnings were paid out in the form of cash, 
rounded up to the nearest quarter. The participant 
also received a $30 USD gift card for participating. 
 
2.3. Manipulations 
 
Amongst the dyad, the participant was always the 
banker, and the runner was either a human 
confederate or the Nao robot. The Nao robot is a 
commercially-available humanoid robot with 
anthropomorphic features (e.g., eye gaze, natural 
movements). Users can program the robot to say 
various statements, as well as address people by 
name. In the current study, the robot introduced 
himself and stated he was ready to perform the task.  
We sought to examine differences in trust and 
suspicion across time depending on whether 
participants interacted with a human or the Nao 
robot. If participants were assigned to the human 
condition, the participants and the confederate 
introduced themselves, and the experimenter stated 
that the two would complete the study 
simultaneously. If participants were assigned to the 
robot condition, we described that the robot behaves 
in a self-preserving manner, which would be 
beneficial if the robot operated in a dangerous 
environment in contexts outside the experiment. We 
included this backstory to provide a reasonable 
explanation as to potential reasons the robot may 
engage in distrust behaviors. All participants’ 
experiences with the runner were identical. Within 
the first three time points, the runner returned the 
amount of money that was promised (i.e., a 
trustworthy behavior). At the fourth and fifth time 
points, the runner returned less money than was 
promised to the banker (i.e., a distrust behavior). In 
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the final time point, the runner engaged in another 
trusting behavior by returning the amount promised. 
All the runner’s data, including maze 
performance, returning of investment to banker, was 
prerecorded. This level of control allowed a focus on 
the way that participants trusted their partner. 
However, participants were led to believe they were 
interacting with the robotic or human partner in real-
time. 
 
2.4. Measures 
 
2.4.1. Dispositional Trust. Dispositional trust was 
assessed using two measures: Propensity to Trust 
scale [19] and the IPIP NEO-PI-R Agreeableness 
Trust facet [21]. 
 
2.4.1.1. Propensity to Trust scale. The Propensity to 
Trust scale [19] is an 8-item scale used to measure 
one’s general tendency to trust others. Two items 
(i.e., “One should be very cautious of strangers” and 
“These days, you must be alert or someone is likely 
to take advantage of you”) were removed during data 
cleaning, due to these items reducing the internal 
consistency of the scale. A sample item is, “Most 
experts tell the truth about the limits of their 
knowledge.” The Cronbach’s alpha for the current 
study was .68. 
 
2.4.1.2 IPIP NEO-PI-R Agreeableness Trust facet. 
The IPIP NEO-PI-R Agreeableness Trust facet [21] is 
a 10-item scale used to measure dispositional trust.  
Two items (i.e., “Suspect hidden motives in others” 
and “Am wary of others”) were removed during data 
cleaning, due to these items reducing the internal 
consistency of the scale. A sample item from this 
scale is, “Trust others.” The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
current study was .83. 
 
2.4.3. Dispositional Distrust. Dispositional distrust 
was assessed using seven items adapted from the 
General Distrust Scale [31]. Three items (i.e., “Most 
people can be trusted to behave fairly,” “Most people 
can be trusted to cooperate with others,” and “Most 
people can be trusted to behave selflessly”) were 
removed, due to these items assessing dispositional 
trust. A sample item from this scale is, “Most people 
tend to be selfish.” The Cronbach’s alpha for the 
current study was .77. 
 
2.4.4. Suspicion Propensity. Dispositional suspicion 
was assessed using seven items adapted from the 
Suspicion Propensity scale [27]. A sample item from 
this scale is, “I am naturally suspicious.” The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the current study was .38. Note 
that due to the unreliability of this scale, we interpret 
the results below cautiously. 
 
2.4.5. Trust. Context-dependent trust in the partner 
was assessed using 11 items adapted from the Trust 
in Automated Systems scale [32]. Participants 
completed this scale six times (i.e., once per round). 
This measure was chosen because the items were 
applicable to both partner conditions. The referent 
was modified from “the system” to “the runner.” A 
sample item from this scale is, “The runner is 
dependable.” Cronbach’s alpha for the initial time 
point was .89. 
 
 2.4.6. Suspicion. Context-dependent suspicion was 
assessed using nine items adapted from [33]. Again, 
participants answered this scale once per each round. 
A sample item from this scale is, “I felt like I was 
being taken advantage of when doing this round.”  
Cronbach’s alpha for the initial time point was .85. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
We modeled the change in context-dependent 
trust and suspicion over time using a series of 
discontinuous growth models [34]. Discontinuous 
growth models are hierarchical linear models that 
incorporate an abrupt change(s) in the growth 
process, which aligns with the abrupt trust violations 
in the experimental design. Specifically, 
discontinuous growth models have three basic 
parameters to be coded including: (a) time (i.e., the 
initial linear slope before the abrupt change), (b) 
transition (i.e., the amount of change in the intercept 
after the specific event), and (c) the recovery (i.e., the 
amount of change in the linear slope after the event; 
see Table 1 for the coding strategies adopted). Note 
that the initial time point is coded as zero. In order to 
maintain consistency, we describe the time points 
from zero to five henceforth.  
Researchers can use different coding techniques 
of the time variable to alter the interpretations of the 
time parameters [34]. Specifically, the initial time 
slope can be recoded to test whether the transition is 
significantly different from zero (i.e., absolute), 
rather than assessing the relative change in the 
intercept (see coding for Time.A in Table 1). In the 
current study, we used the absolute coding strategy 
for the time slope, which indicted whether or not the 
decrease in trust, and the increase in suspicion, was 
significantly different than zero. Finally, the time 
variable can also be coded to test the absolute change 
Page 5102
  
in the recovery parameter (see the Time.R variable in 
Table 1). We used the absolute recovery term, which 
tests whether the slope occurring after the distrust 
behavior was significantly different from zero, rather 
than testing whether the recovery slope was 
significantly different from the initial time slope.  
Our current model had two discrete transition 
periods (i.e., the distrust behavior that occurred at 
time point three and the trusting behavior that 
occurred at time point five; see Figure 1). Because 
the model with two transitions failed to converge, we 
omitted the second transition term and modeled only 
the first five measurements.  
 
Table 1. Coding schemes for the discontinuous 
growth models 
Time Time.A Time.R Transition Recovery 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 
2 2 2 0 0 
3 2 3 1 0 
4 2 3 1 1 
Note. All coding strategies were based on suggestions by 
Bliese & Lang (2016). Time.A depicts the absolute change 
in the transition event. Time.R depicts an absolute change 
in the recovery term. 
 
 
Figure 1. A hypothetical demonstration of the 
transition periods modeled in the current study. 
Note the fifth time point was removed from the 
statistical analysis, due to a lack of convergence. 
 
In order to test these growth models, we followed 
a stepwise procedure outlined by Bliese and Lang 
[34] using the nlme package in R [35, 36]. First, the 
discontinuous growth model is an extension of the 
general growth model, in which a stepwise procedure 
is outlined by Bliese and Ployhart [37]. Generally, 
the first step frees the intercept, which allows all 
participants to have different initial levels of the 
outcome variable (i.e., trust, suspicion). Step 2 
determines the appropriate change in the outcome 
variable over time (e.g., linear, quadratic) and 
simultaneously allows the participants to have 
different change patterns over time (i.e., random 
slope variance). Discontinuous growth models focus 
on Step 2. Specifically, within the random slope 
variation, we coded where the transition (i.e., where 
the slope changes abruptly) and the recovery (i.e., the 
slope after the abrupt change) occurs. We placed the 
transition at the third time point (i.e., where the 
distrust behavior occurred), and we coded the 
recovery to occur at time point four (i.e., immediately 
after the transition). In Step 3, autocorrelation was 
tested to determine whether the correlations are 
stronger for time points occurring closer together in 
time, as well as testing the assumption of 
homoscedasticity. Finally, Step 4 involved adding 
person-level predictors of the growth pattern (e.g., 
dispositional trust). Following Bliese and Ployhart, 
we removed any term from the model that was non-
significant. 
In Step 4, we added the dispositional variables in 
a specific order, which was consistent for both trust 
and suspicion outcome models. The first model 
included two demographic variable (i.e., gender and 
age). We then tested whether dispositional trust, 
measured with the Propensity to Trust scale [19] and 
the IPIP NEO-PI-R Agreeableness Trust facet [21], 
predicted changes in trust over time simultaneously, 
due to both scales measuring the general tendency to 
trust others. Next, we added dispositional distrust to 
the model to test whether dispositional distrust 
predicted changes in outcomes after controlling for 
variance explained by the dispositional trust scale(s). 
We placed dispositional distrust into the second 
model, as research on dispositional distrust has been 
minimal. Finally, we added dispositional suspicion to 
the model in the final step, as this trait has received 
the least amount of research attention. 
 
3.1. Trust in partner  
 
The first model tested changes in perceived trust 
in partner over time. Note that Level-2 variables 
(e.g., partner condition) were not entered into the 
equation until Step 4, so Step 1 through Step 3 
estimates were averaged across the partner 
conditions. In Step 1, we found an ICC estimate of 
.57, and thus we allowed initial trust perceptions to 
vary across participants (i.e., random intercept 
variance). In Step 2, we found evidence of a 
significant increase in trust throughout the first three 
rounds (B = 0.27, t(193) = 3.89, p < .01) and a 
significant decrease in trust after the distrust behavior 
in round 3 (B = -1.06, t(193) = -8.00, p < .01). The 
recovery term was also significantly different from 
zero, B = -0.40, t(193) = -2.85, p < .01, so we 
included the recovery term as a fixed effect. The 
slope variance for the time term, Δχ2(2) = 33.83, p < 
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.01, and the transition term, Δχ2(3) = 39.12, p < .01, 
were both significant, so we estimated a separate time 
and transition slope for each participant. We 
observed no significant slope variance for the 
recovery term, so we fixed the recovery term to be 
equal across all participants. Step 3 showed no 
significant autocorrelation of errors and no 
significant violations of homoscedasticity, and thus 
we omitted these from the model. Finally, we added 
the Level-2 variables into the model. 
We found no significant differences for either the 
linear time variable or the transition period between 
the Partner types (i.e., robot versus human), so we 
removed the partner type from the model. Amongst 
the demographic variables (i.e., age and gender), we 
found no significant predictors for the linear or the 
transition periods. Next, we found that the Propensity 
to Trust scale [19] significantly moderated the 
transition phase and trust relationship while 
controlling for IPIP NEO-PI-R Agreeableness Trust 
facet scores, γ = 0.54, t(189) = 2.07, p < .05, see 
Table 2.  
Specifically, the negative slope in trust following 
the distrust behavior was weaker for participants who 
scored higher on the Propensity to Trust scale (see 
Figure 2). IPIP NEO-PI-R Agreeableness Trust facet 
scores failed to predict changes in trust in the runner 
over time when controlling for scores from the 
Propensity to Trust scale. Dispositional distrust had 
no significant relationship with changes in trust over 
time. Finally, dispositional suspicion was a 
significant predictor of the intercept term, γ = -0.49, 
t(46) = 2.00, p < .05. This means that the initial levels 
of trust were lower for those who reported higher 
levels of dispositional suspicion. 
 
 
Figure 2. Differences in trust change over time 
depending on participants’ level of dispositional 
trust measured by the Propensity to Trust Scale. 
 
 
3.2. Suspicion perceptions of partner  
 
The second model tested the change in suspicion 
of the partner over time. In Step 1, we found an ICC 
estimate of .39, so we allowed each participant to 
have his/her own initial suspicion estimate. Again, 
Level-2 variables (e.g., partner condition) were not 
entered until Step 4, so Step 1 through Step 3 
estimates were averaged across both partner 
conditions. In Step 2, we found evidence of 
significant increase in suspicion after the 
manipulation condition (B = 1.04, t(193) = 6.32, p < 
.01). The initial time slope term and the recovery 
term were not significantly different from zero. We 
observed significant slope variance for the linear time 
term, Δχ2(2) = 22.45, p < .01, and the transition term, 
Δχ2(3) = 7.96, p < .05. Thus, we estimated separate 
time and transition slopes for each participant. We 
found no significant autocorrelation of errors or 
violations of homoscedasticity, so we removed those 
Table 2. Changes of trust over time with Level-2 
predictors included. 
Fixed Effect Estimate SE df t-value 
Intercept 4.91 0.14 193 34.00** 
Time 0.27 0.07 193 3.89* 
Transition -1.06 0.13 193 -8.00** 
Recovery -0.40 0.14 193 -2.85** 
Partnera -0.09 0.10 47 -0.86 
Time*Partnera 0.03 0.16 191 0.68 
Trans*Partnera -0.17 0.13 191 -1.26 
Ageb 0.02 0.02 46 0.78 
Genderb -0.17 0.10 46 -1.65 
Time*Ageb -0.01 0.01 189 -0.85 
Time*Genderb 0.02 0.06 189 0.30 
Trans*Ageb -0.04 0.03 189 -1.47 
Trans*Genderb -0.15 0.14 189 -1.06 
PTc 0.24 0.20 46 1.19 
IPTrustc 0.20 0.19 46 1.05 
Time*PTc 0.13 0.12 189 1.04 
Time*IPTrustc -0.09 0.12 189 -0.77 
Trans*PTc 0.54 0.26 189 2.07* 
Trans*IPTrustc -0.01 0.25 189 -0.02 
Disd -0.17 0.18 46 -0.94 
Time*Disd 0.16 0.10 190 1.67 
Trans* Disd 0.20 0.24 190 0.85 
SPe -0.49 0.23 46 -2.09* 
Time*SPe 0.13 0.14 190 0.94 
Trans* SPe 0.01 0.32 190 0.03 
Note. N = 49. Superscripts indicate the step in which the 
Level-2 predictors were entered. The recovery period was 
excluded, due to a lack of significant recovery variance 
across participants. Human was the reference group for 
Partner factor variable. Female was reference group for 
Gender. PT = Propensity to Trust scale. IPTrust = IPIP 
NEO-PI-R Agreeableness Trust facet scale. Dis = General 
Distrust scale. SP = Suspicion propensity scale. *p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
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from the model. Finally, we added the Level-2 
variables. 
First, we tested whether any changes in suspicion 
over time could be predicted by whether the 
participant’s partner was a human or robot. We found 
no significant differences in changes in suspicion 
over time across partner conditions, so we removed 
the partner type from the model. Amongst the 
demographic variables, we found that age was a 
positive, significant predictor of the increase in 
suspicion perceptions corresponding to the transition 
(i.e., immediately after the distrust behavior), γ = 
0.06, t(189) = 2.08, p < .05. Thus, the increase in 
suspicion after the distrust behavior was stronger for 
older participants than for younger participants (see 
Figure 3). In the subsequent step, we found non-
significant effects for dispositional trust using the 
Propensity to Trust scale [19], the IPIP NEO-PI_R 
Agreeableness Trust facet scale [21], nor the General 
Distrust scale [29], see Table 3.  
Similar to the trust findings, we found that 
dispositional suspicion predicted participants’ initial 
suspicion reports, γ = 0.70, t(46) = 2.08, p < .05. 
Thus, participants who reported higher levels of 
dispositional suspicion also reported higher levels of 
context-dependent suspicion at the first time point 
(i.e., time point 0). We recommend interpreting the 
dispositional propensity findings with caution, given 
the low reliability of the measure.  
 
 
Figure 3. Differences in suspicion change over 
time depending on participants’ age. 
 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
In general, when participants’ partners (i.e., either 
human or robot) engaged in behaviors detrimental to 
participants’ goals (i.e., retuning the participant less 
money than promised), participants reported 
decreased trust and increased suspicion. Past research 
has shown others’ distrust behaviors decrease trust 
[38], and we found similar findings using both human 
and anthropomorphized robot partners.  
We observed no differences in trust or suspicion 
perceptions between a human partner and a robot 
partner, which deviates from prior findings that some 
people perceive intelligent technologies as being 
perfectly reliable (i.e., the perfect automation schema 
[8, 39]). If participants perceived the partner as 
infallible, we would have expected trust decrease to 
 
Table 3. Changes in suspicion over time with 
Level-2 predictors included. 
Fixed Effect Estimate SE df t-value 
Intercept 2.64 0.15 193 17.93** 
Time -0.13 0.09 193 -1.55 
Transition 1.04 0.16 193 6.32** 
Recovery 0.27 0.17 193 1.55 
Partnera 0.09 0.15 47 0.59 
Time*Partnera -0.06 0.09 191 -0.65 
Trans*Partnera 0.15 0.13 191 1.12 
Ageb -0.04 0.03 46 -1.27 
Genderb 0.14 0.15 46 0.92 
Time*Ageb 0.02 0.02 189 1.04 
Time*Genderb -0.03 0.09 189 -0.32 
Trans*Ageb 0.06 0.03 189 2.08* 
Trans*Genderb 0.11 0.13 189 0.79 
PTc -0.23 0.29 45 -0.77 
IPTrustc -0.37 0.27 45 -1.35 
Time*PTc -0.12 0.18 188 -0.64 
Time*IPTrustc 0.18 0.17 188 1.01 
Trans*PTc -0.30 0.26 188 -1.15 
Trans*IPTrustc 0.15 0.24 188 0.62 
Disd 0.33 0.24 46 1.40 
Time*Disd -0.11 0.15 190 -0.73 
Trans* Dis d -0.02 0.21 190 -0.12 
SPe 0.70 0.33 46 2.08* 
Time*SPe -0.03 0.21 190 -0.16 
Trans* SPe 0.23 0.30 190 0.75 
Note. N = 49. Superscripts indicate the step in which the 
Level-2 predictors were entered. The recovery period 
term was excluded, due to a lack of significant recovery 
variance across participants. Human was the reference 
group for Partner factor variable. Female was reference 
group for Gender. PT = Propensity to Trust scale. Trust = 
IPIP NEO-PI-R Agreeableness Trust facet scale. Dis = 
General Distrust scale. SP = Suspicion propensity scale. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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be steeper after a distrusting behavior for the robot 
partner compared to the human partner. One 
explanation for these findings, however, is that 
context-dependent trust mediates interactions 
between both humans and robots [40]. If so, there 
may be no differences in perceived trust, regardless 
of whether the partner is a human or a robot. 
Alternatively, the backstory describing the Nao robot 
as having “self-preserving algorithms” may have 
attenuated the differences in human-human and 
human-robot trust by clearly stating a rationale for 
the robot to engage in a distrust behavior. Finally, 
note that prior research has questioned the degree to 
which interpersonal trust is appropriate with robot 
partners, as robots lack a sense of self [41]. Prior 
research, however, has shown that people attribute 
moral qualities to robots [42], which may have been 
highlighted by the robot’s anthropomorphic features 
(see Method section above).  
Overall, we found dispositional trust measured 
via the Propensity to Trust scale [19] significantly 
moderated the decrease in trust immediately 
following a distrust behavior. Specifically, those 
scoring higher in dispositional trust showed a less 
steep decrease in context-dependent trust after the 
distrust behavior compared to those lower in 
dispositional trust. Thus, it appears that high levels of 
dispositional trust may attenuate the effects trust 
violations have on participants’ trust in a referent. 
Although we included only two rounds where the 
partner engaged in selfish behaviors, these findings 
suggest that dispositional trust may leave a person 
vulnerable to continuing to trust an entity that is less 
trustworthy than desired. Future research, however, 
should investigate whether this pattern is sustained 
with more observations of distrust behaviors.  
The dispositional variables, however, failed to 
predict changes in suspicion over time. Age, 
however, significantly predicted the transition phase 
for suspicion. Specifically, older participants reported 
higher levels of suspicion after trust violations 
committed by their partners compared to younger 
participants. These results may suggest that older 
participants were more sensitive to their partners’ 
behaviors than younger participants. One of the three 
characteristics of suspicion is increased cognitive 
activity [26, 27]. Future research should investigate 
whether older participants might be more willing to 
put forth the cognitive effort necessary to increase 
suspicion in the moment. 
Implications from the current study involve the 
influence of both age and dispositional trust on 
changes in the trust process over time. First, age 
should be included as a covariate when researchers 
investigate changes in trust or suspicion over time, 
especially if the experimental design includes a 
distrust behavior. If researchers fail to consider the 
effects of age on suspicion in the moment, they are 
omitting an important explanatory factor throughout 
the trust process. 
Practitioners should consider how a person’s 
dispositional trust may affect his or her trust of either 
human or robot partners. There are two possible 
practical arguments for these findings. First, a trustor 
should see the trustee as less trustworthy when the 
trustee engages in actions that undermine the trustor’s 
well-being and practical goals. If dispositional trust 
undermines the extent to which a person can 
accurately monitor the trustworthiness of a partner 
that engages in selfish acts, researchers and 
practitioners alike should be very clear in explaining 
to people—especially those who have high 
dispositional trust tendencies—the negative effects of 
unwarranted trustworthiness perceptions to attenuate 
improperly calibrated trust towards the referent. 
On the other hand, propensity to trust may limit 
the degree to which people prematurely lose trust in a 
partner who makes one or two mistakes. As previous 
research has shown that violations of trust can lead to 
automation disuse (i.e., refusing to use automated 
aids that would help performance; see [43]), it is 
important that trust is not abandoned prematurely. 
More research is needed to further delineate 
appropriate levels of trust over time given the 
person’s level of dispositional trust. 
There were limitations to this research. First, our 
study had limitations associated with the sample. The 
sample included only undergraduate students. Thus, 
we may observe different results if we conducted the 
study with a different age group. For example, 
previous research has shown that trust in automation 
is higher for older adults compared to younger adults 
[44, 45]. Note, however, that we observed differences 
in suspicion changes across time with a sample 
consisting of mostly young adults. Future research 
should study whether the results can be replicated 
with a sample that includes older adults. The sample 
size may have also been small for the DCM analyses, 
especially with the few number of observations 
within subjects. Thus, future research should expand 
on these findings with larger sample sizes.  
Prior research has suggested that trust differences 
may occur across cultures [46, 47]. Because our 
sample included undergraduate students from a 
Midwestern American university, these relationships 
should be tested using samples from different 
countries of origins and ethnicities. Finally, the 
dispositional suspicion measure showed an 
unacceptably low internal consistency estimate. 
Although prior research has shown the Suspicion 
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Propensity scale [27] to have multiple facets, which 
may attenuate observed internal consistency 
estimates, future research should investigate further 
the psychometric properties of this scale. Participants 
may have also found it difficult to separate 
dispositional distrust and suspicion propensity, as 
these variables show similar theoretical overlap. The 
observed correlation between the two individual 
difference variables was .56, which provides some 
evidence that, although related, participants were able 
to distinguish between the two variables.  
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